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This discusses the unique experience of Peru’s Central Bank with inflation 
targeting in an economy characterized by a high degree of financial dollarization. 
The paper outlines how Peru has taken financial dollarization into consideration 
in the design of monetary policy, then deals with monetary policy implementation 
and the Central Bank’s strategy for controlling financial dollarization risks. The 
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1. Introduction 
 
The theoretical and policy literatures do not provide a clear answer about optimal monetary and 
exchange rate policies in a dual-currency economy. Some financially dollarized economies, 
however, have recently moved from hard pegs to more flexible exchange rate regimes.   
Questions nonetheless remain regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy in a financially 
dollarized economy, how to deal with financial dollarization risks, and how to restore long-run 
confidence in the domestic currency. 
Inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework has become popular among several 
emerging market economies, especially since the end of the past decade. Inflation targeting gives 
the central bank an explicit and permanent commitment to price stability. If this commitment is 
credible, it allows the anchoring of expected inflation at the target level. Therefore, inflation 
targeting enhances monetary policy effectiveness and is a possible way to restore the domestic 
currency role of store of value. 
On this basis, the Central Bank of Peru has engaged in a monetary policy based on 
inflation targeting since 2002. This is the only case so far known of a financially dollarized 
economy that has adopted an inflation targeting framework. 
Although financial dollarization has been steadily declining in Peru in the last few years, 
it remains significant. By the end of 2004, 55 percent of broad money and more than 70 percent 
of credit to the private sector were denominated in foreign currency. Financial dollarization must 
therefore be taken into consideration when designing and implementing monetary policy in Peru, 
both to control its inherent risks and to promote the role of the domestic currency as a store of 
value. 
Compared with an environment without dollarization, the design and implementation of 
the inflation targeting framework in a financially dollarized economy like Peru differ in many 
ways. The differences have to do with the inflation target, the operational target, the inflation 
forecasting system, and the Central Bank’s responses for dealing with financial dollarization 
risks.  
In terms of the inflation target, the Central Bank has chosen a level that is lower than that 
in the other inflation targeting countries in Latin America. These countries have annual inflation 
targets that range from 3 percent to 5.5 percent, while Peru’s target is 2.5 percent (with a 
maximum tolerated deviation of 1 percentage point above and below the target). This is related 
  5to the need to have a credible commitment to maintaining strict price stability. With strict price 
stability, similar to long-run inflation in the United States, the domestic currency is in a better 
position to compete against the U.S. dollar. 
Under inflation targeting, the operational target changed from a banking reserves 
objective to an interest rate target. In addition to the widespread benefits of having interest rates 
as the operational target, in Peru this further helps to dedollarize the economy by means of the 
increased stability and predictability of the short-term interest rate in domestic currency. These 
effects on the short-term interest rate, as well as the recent development of a benchmark yield 
curve for public debt in domestic currency, favor the issuance of long-term financial instruments 
by the private sector. This induces financial dedollarization and thus reduces the vulnerability of 
the economy to the balance-sheet effect of large domestic currency depreciations. 
Financial dollarization also affects the implementation of monetary policy. Although the 
inflation forecasting system of Peru’s Central Bank is very similar to those of other inflation- 
targeting central banks that do not face financial dollarization, there are some differences. These 
differences are basically concerned with the specification of the investment-savings (IS) curve in 
forecasting models, taking into consideration the possible effects of financial dollarization 
through aggregate demand. In particular, the Central Bank’s quarterly projection model extends 
the IS curve to allow for the presence of both the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate. 
There is also an inertia term in the exchange rate equation, given the Central Bank’s aim of 
moderating excessive exchange rate volatility. 
To reduce the negative effects of stressed markets on a financially dollarized economy, 
the Central Bank implements several policies. These negative effects are related to the fact that 
financial dollarization makes the economy face an exchange rate risk and increases the liquidity 
risk. To deal with these risks, the Central Bank promotes financial dedollarization, tries to induce 
economic agents to internalize financial dollarization risks, and tries to prevent the balance sheet 
effect of large domestic currency depreciations, aiming at the same time to assure the availability 
of liquid funds in foreign currency for a contingent financial sector liquidity shortage. The latter 
type of policy involves the moderation of excessive exchange rate volatility, requiring 
commercial banks to have large reserves on their foreign currency liabilities, and maintaining a 
high level of Central Bank international reserves. 
  6The next section outlines how Peru has taken into consideration financial dollarization in 
the design of monetary policy. Section 3 deals with monetary policy implementation, while 
Section 4 describes the Central Bank’s strategy for controlling financial dollarization risks. 
Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
 
2. Inflation  Targeting  under  Financial Dollarization  
 
The Central Bank used a monetary targeting framework during the disinflation process (1991-
2001). In the new low-inflation environment (since 2002), the base money growth rate has 
become more unpredictable, and it is no longer suitable for communicating the stance of 
monetary policy. In this context, in 2002 the Central Bank adopted inflation targeting, an 
approach made feasible given its autonomy and operational independence.
1 The Central Bank’s 
monetary policy decisions are made in terms of changes in its operational target. Since 2001, the 
timing of monetary policy meetings is made public at the beginning of the year, and the policy 
decision is immediately announced after each meeting. 
 
2.1 The Inflation Target 
 
As seen in Table 1, the characteristics of the inflation target in Peru are largely the same as in 
other countries that have reached and maintain a low inflation rate that is consistent with their 
long-run inflation target level.  
 
                                            
1 The Constitution establishes that the Central Bank’s objective is to preserve monetary stability. It also stipulates 
the Central Bank’s autonomy according to the Charter Law. This autonomy is supported by the fact that the central 
bank is explicitly prohibited to take actions against its objective, which include the prohibition of granting direct 
loans to the Treasury. 
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Table 1
Inflation targets in some IT countries
Country Inflation target Target's horizon
Australia 2% to 3% (since 1993) Medium term
Brazil 5.1% (for 2005) 1 year
Canada 1% to 3% (since 1998) Medium term
Chile 2% to 4% (since 2001) Medium term
Colombia 4.5% to 5.5% (for 2005) 1 year
Czech Republic 2% to 4% (since 2005) Medium term
Mexico 2% to 4% (since 2004) Medium term
Norway 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2001) Medium term
Peru 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2002) Medium term
Philippines 4% to 5% (for 2004-2005) 2 years
Poland 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2004) Medium term
Sweden 1% to 3% (since 1995) Medium term
England 2% Medium term
 
 
Table 1 shows that countries that are in a disinflation process (Brazil, Colombia, and the 
Philippines) state their inflation targets for one or two years. Countries that have already reached 
a low inflation rate state that they will try to maintain it indefinitely at that level (for the medium 
term). The inflation target level in the latter group of countries is between 2 and 3 percent. Once 
the long-run inflation target has been reached, central banks usually stop revising the target.  
This is a signal of stability for long-run savings and investment decisions. 
Chile and Peru, among the Latin American countries in Table 1, ended their disinflation 
processes at least three years ago.
2 Both countries have now reached an inflation rate that is 
consistent with their long-run inflation targets. The Peruvian inflation target is similar to the 
average U.S. inflation rate in the past 90 years, and it is the lowest inflation target level in Latin 
America. 
In the case of Peru, the chosen level for the inflation target involves the need for a 
credible commitment to maintaining strict price stability, given the country’s domestic 
dollarization, whereby the U.S. dollar serves as a substitute for domestic currency for all 
functions of money. With strict price stability, similar to U.S. long-run inflation, the domestic 
  8currency is in a better position to compete against the U.S. dollar. In particular, by keeping 
domestic currency long-term purchasing power similar to that of the U.S. dollar, there is a higher 
probability of reducing real and payments dollarization in the economy.
3  Financial dollarization 
could thus eventually be lowered.   
From a historical view, the Peruvian economy has not recorded an inflation rate of 2.5 
percent since the 1930s. As Table 2 shows, such a level can be taken as consistent with monetary 
stability.  
 
Table 2. Average Inflation Rates in Peru, 1900-2004 
 























1/ Average annual percent for the period.
   
Source: Compendio de estadísticas monetarias 1959-95 
(Central Bank of Peru) and Central Bank Annual Reports. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
2 In the disinflation period, when the Central Bank did not use an inflation targeting framework but monetary 
targeting, the central bank began to announce one-year inflation targets in 1994 (Rossini, 2001). 
3 Real dollarization is the indexing of local prices and wages to the US dollar; payments dollarization, on the other 
hand, is the use of foreign currency for transaction purposes. 
  92.2 The Operational Target 
 
The operational target changed when inflation targeting was adopted in 2002. The current 
interest rate target is more in accordance with the inflation targeting framework goal, as well as 
with the need to reduce financial dollarization. In this respect, the volatility of the interbank 
overnight interest rate has decreased and the interest rate pass-through has strengthened. 
For most inflation targeting central banks (and some that do not target inflation, such as 
the European Central Bank and the United States Federal Reserve), the operational target is a 
very short-term money market interest rate, usually the interbank overnight loan interest rate. 
Daily monetary operations are thus oriented toward making the interest rate chosen as the 
operational target the target level announced by the central bank. 
One of the advantages of the interest rate operational target is its communicating force—
that is, the monetary policy stance can be communicated to the public in a clear and simple way. 
Because the stance can be easily understood, monetary policy is more effective and powerful.
4 
For example, a reduction of the interest rate target level indicates to the public that the central 
bank has eased its monetary policy stance, and vice versa. 
A second advantage of an interest rate operational target is that, by means of making the 
short-term interest rate more stable and predictable, it helps to develop a yield curve of interest 
rates for different maturities. In the absence of a stable and predictable short-term interest rate, 
the market has no benchmark to set up interest rates in domestic currency for different maturities. 
When this happens, either there are no long-term operations in domestic currency or, if there are, 
their interest rates are the same as for similar operations in foreign currency (in a financially 
dollarized economy), plus the expected depreciation of the domestic currency. In the latter case, 
domestic currency interest rates would tend to closely follow the evolution of foreign currency 
interest rates and the expected future depreciation of the local currency (as in a pegged exchange 
rate regime). 
The use of an interest rate operational target was not desirable at the beginning of the 
1990s, when the disinflation process in Peru began. The hyperinflation environment made 
communication easier with a monetary target: the gradual reduction of the base money growth 
rate was a good indicator of commitment to disinflation. In addition, the high level and 
  10variability of expected inflation did not favor the use of an interest rate operational target: 
changes in inflation expectations would have created significant noise in signaling the monetary 
policy stance. 
In a low-inflation environment, however, monetary targets are less helpful because 
monetary aggregates tend to be loosely correlated with inflation in the short run. Moreover, it is 
difficult to communicate the policy stance because changes in the monetary target might be due 
to expected changes in money demand. In addition, this target does not favor the capital market 
in domestic currency because the short-term interest rate might be too volatile. 
Given that inflation was already low when inflation targeting was adopted (actually it 
was around zero percent in 2001) and that the interbank overnight interest rate was very volatile 
(its standard deviation in 2001 was close to 1 percentage point), it seemed reasonable to 
gradually move the operational target from a monetary aggregate to the interbank overnight 
interest rate.
5 
The current Central Bank operational procedure targets the interbank overnight interest 
rate. The benchmark interest rate for injection standing facilities acts as a ceiling interest rate for 
the interbank funds market, while the overnight deposits interest rate acts as the floor. Both 
ceiling and floor form the so-called benchmark “corridor” for the interbank interest rate. This 
operational procedure was put in practice in 2002; however, the emphasis on the center of the 
benchmark corridor dates from 2003. 
The evolution of the operational target is summarized in Figure 1.  
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4 Felices and Tuesta (2005) develop a model where both domestic and foreign currency coexist in the economy. 
Their preliminary results show that Peruvian macroeconomic volatility in the last few years has reduced as a 
consequence of changing the basis of the monetary operational target to the interest rate. 
5 Grippa (2004) provides more details on this transition period. 
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During the gradual process of changing the operational target, interbank interest rate 
volatility has been steadily reduced. The current variability of this interest rate is low, 
comparable to that of other central banks with a similar operational target. In 2004, the standard 
deviation of the interbank interest rate was 7 basis points, while that of the U.S. Fed funds rate 
was 4 basis points. 
 
 
Table 3. Interbank Interest Rate 
(Percentage points)
Year  Average Standard deviation 
1998  18.7 6.45
1999  15.0 4.72
2000  12.6 2.67
2001  9.0 0.91
2002  3.2 0.48
2003  3.4 0.09
2004  2.7 0.07
 
 
The reduction in interbank overnight interest rate variability has made monetary policy 
more predictable and has thus significantly strengthened the impact of changes in this interest 
rate on other interest rates in domestic currency. 
Lahura (2005) estimates the interest rate pass-through. He analyzes the effect of inflation 
targeting on this interest rate pass-through and finds that since 2001, with the announcement of 
the operational target and the adoption of the inflation targeting framework in 2002, the pass-
through from changes in the interbank overnight interest rate to interest rates on loans and 
deposits has significantly increased. 
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Figure 2 shows the increase in the interest rate pass-through for seven different interest 
rates (loans and deposits) over the past few years (the shaded area is the inflation targeting 
period). 
According to Lahura (2005), before the announcement of the operational target in 2001, 
the interest rate pass-through was statistically different from zero for just two of the seven 
interest rates considered. Since the announcement of the operational target, the interest rate pass-
  14through began to increase in all of seven cases considered: at the end of 2004, the pass-through 
from the interbank overnight interest rate to interest rates on loans and deposits interest rates was 
greater than 0.5. Moreover, he finds that the impact of changes in the interbank interest rate is 
greater on interest rates on loans than on deposit interest rates. 
A key feature in the design of the operational target in a dollarized economy is how this 
target can be used to manage a large domestic currency depreciation. This is important because 
large exchange rate movements may be harmful for economic activity in Peru, given financial 
dollarization (see Carranza, Cayo, and Galdón-Sánchez, 2003, for a discussion on the balance 
sheet effect in Peru). 
The former monetary operational target allowed the central bank to separate the effect of 
a shock into two parts, between the interest rate and the exchange rate (part of the shock could 
also be absorbed through forex sales). In practice, the maintenance of a monetary target allowed 
the Central Bank to reduce the effect of the shock on the exchange rate by means of increasing 
its effect on the interest rate. This was the case in the second part of the 1990s, when the 
Peruvian economy was successively hit by significant negative shocks (Asia in 1997, Russia in 
1998, and Brazil in 1999). The current interest rate operational target maintains this possibility: 
there is an escape clause by which, in extreme situations, the interbank interest rate may increase 
to prevent a significant domestic currency depreciation from triggering the balance sheet effect, 
undermining economic activity and the solvency of the financial system. 
When there is a strong negative shock that is expected to cause a large domestic currency 
depreciation, the escape clause may spread its effect between the interbank overnight interest rate 
and the exchange rate (Figure 3). This has been put into practice only once, in September 2002. 
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  163.  Monetary Policy Implementation under Financial Dollarization 
 
The implementation of monetary policy in Peru considered financial dollarization and its effects 
on the economy. In this respect, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) study a sample of 
partially dollarized economies (including Peru) and find that this fact does not necessarily 
prevent monetary policy from bringing inflation under control. 
The Central Bank, as does any other inflation targeting central bank, uses an inflation 
forecasting system to anticipate future inflation pressures and be able to decide today on 
measures to counteract them. In addition, the Central Bank implements some policies to deal 
with financial dollarization risks. This section focuses on the inflation forecasting system and 
how it accounts for the presence of financial dollarization and its effects on the economy. 
Control of financial dollarization risks is discussed later. 
 
3.1 The Inflation Forecasting System  
 
The principal inflation forecasting model is the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM).
6 QPM 
forecasts assume that monetary, foreign exchange, and financial markets are not under stress. 
Otherwise nonlinearities, which are not considered in the system, might appear. 
The QPM is a standard semi-structural calibrated model. Because there are few data 
available for a low-inflation environment in the Peruvian economy, special emphasis is placed on 
the calibration of the QPM parameters, which are continuously assessed. 
The model analyzes dynamics around trends, which are interpreted as short-term 
equilibria. QPM is thus focused on a flow analysis (variables are expressed as deviations from 
trends or as rates of growth), and restrictions are imposed to ensure long-run neutrality of 
nominal variables on real ones and to guarantee inflation convergence toward the target (2.5 
percent). 
The model has four main blocks: a Phillips curve, an IS curve, an exchange rate equation, 
and a monetary policy rule. The differences with models used by other inflation targeting central 
banks are basically concerned with two equations: the IS curve and the exchange rate. 
Aggregate supply (Phillips Curve). The Phillips Curve models core inflation dynamics. 
The right hand side of the equation incorporates the following: (i) demand factors (output gap), 
(ii) expected future inflation, (iii) imported inflation, and (iv) core inflation inertia. Central Bank 
                                            
6 A close reference to the QPM is Luque and Vega (2003). 
  17specialists forecast supply factors and non-core inflation components. This is done by means of 
anticipating future weather conditions; assessing information about crops and food supply, tax 
arrangements and regulated prices (public tariffs), the recent evolution of input prices and short- 
term demand indicators, and considering seasonality.  
The effect of a domestic currency depreciation on inflation is captured by the imported 
inflation term. The QPM has a relatively low exchange rate-to-prices pass-through: a 1 percent 
transitory increase in the exchange rate (sol/US$) causes an accumulated response of inflation of 
0.15 percentage points (inflation deviates an accumulated 0.15 percentage points from the target) 
in one year, as shown in Figure 4. Given that the accumulated depreciation of the domestic 
currency in the same period of time is 0.79 percent, QPM implicitly considers an exchange rate-
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Figure 4. Quarterly Projection Model Simulation: 
Headline Inflation Path after a 1-Percent  








The fact that most prices in the economy are set in domestic currency and not indexed to 
the exchange rate (low real dollarization) is a key factor in explaining the low exchange rate-to-
prices pass-through coefficient. The coefficient is similar to that in Miller (2003), Winkelried 
  18(2003), and Morón and Lama (2005). These studies find that the pass-through from the exchange 
rate to consumer prices is between 0.15 and 0.30 percentage points in one year. 
McCarthy (1999) develops an empirical model to assess the transmission from the 
exchange rate to three types of prices: importer, producer and consumer. Miller (2003) uses this 
model for Peruvian data and finds that the nominal exchange rate-to-prices pass-throughs are 89, 
46, and 16 percentage points, respectively, in one year. 
Winkelried (2003) uses McCarthy’s model and incorporates asymmetries into the 
analysis. He estimates the pass-through to consumer prices to be 0.15 percentage points in one 
year. However, this estimate could rise to 0.30 percentage points in a year during the expansion 
phase of the business cycle. 
Finally, Morón and Lama (2005) use the same basic model and add a monetary sector to 
the analysis. Their estimated pass-through coefficients to importer, wholesaler, and consumer 
prices are 80, 30, and 20 percentage points in one year, respectively. 
 Aggregate Demand (IS curve). Aggregate demand pressures are represented by the 
output gap. To capture its dynamics, the QPM includes the following: (i) the domestic currency 
interest rate; (ii) the sol/US$ bilateral real exchange rate; (iii) the foreign currency interest rate;
7 
(iv) fiscal conditions that reflect the effect of the fiscal stance on the output gap; and (v) foreign 
economic conditions, which include terms of trade, the multilateral real exchange rate, and 
economic activity abroad. 
The particularity of the IS equation is in the first three terms. Both domestic currency and 
foreign currency interest rates are measured as deviations from their steady-state values, with the 
domestic rate being the interbank overnight real interest rate in Peru and the foreign rate being 
the 3-month LIBOR real interest rate. An increase in any of the three terms (the two interest rates 
and the change in the bilateral real exchange rate) reduces the output gap. 
The domestic interest rate component in the IS curve indicates the power monetary policy 
has to affect economic activity in the short run. An interest rate increase creates disincentives in 
consumption through the substitution, income, and wealth effects, as well as through interest 
payments on debts; investment is negatively affected by the higher user cost of capital. In the 
QPM, a 1 percentage point increase in the domestic currency interest rate reduces the output gap 
by 0.17 percent. This estimate is higher than Llosa and Miller’s (2004) estimate (-0.10 percent). 
                                            
7 A similar type of IS specification can be found in Dancourt et al. (2004). 
  19The difference is related to the fact that the interest rate pass-through has grown in the last few 
years since inflation targeting was adopted (Lahura 2005), and the QPM tries to capture this 
structural change. 
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Table 4. Slope of the IS Curve 
 
Instantaneous Response of Output Gap to Domestic Currency Interest 






Czech Republic   
4/  -0.12
Poland   
5/  -0.65
Turkey   
6/  -0.12
Venezuela 
 7/  -0.06
Peru (QPM)  -0.17
1/   Springer de Freitas and Muinhos (2001). 
2/   Corbo and Tessada (2003). 
3/   Gómez and Julio (2000).   
4/   Benês et al. (2002).  
5/   Łyziak (2001).  
6/   Şahinbeyoğlu (2001). 
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In the group of countries in Table 4, although Peru’s output gap instantaneous response to 
(domestic currency) interest rate changes is lower than that of Poland, Brazil, Chile, and 
Colombia, it is slightly higher than that of the Czech Republic, Turkey, and Venezuela. If 
consumers and firms are net debtors, the interest rate channel in a financially dollarized economy 
may be weaker than in an economy that is not financially dollarized: although an interest rate 
increase still creates disincentives for consumption (through the substitution effect) and 
investment, it also appreciates the domestic currency, reducing the value of foreign currency-
denominated debt (in terms of local currency), and thus rises net wealth.  In this way, the overall 
result may be contrary to what the central bank intends. This is the balance sheet effect, which 
makes monetary policy less effective in a financially dollarized economy 
In this case, the expectations channel might be relatively more important.  If the inflation 
target is credible, an increase in the nominal interest rate by the central bank can be associated 
with lower inflation in the future.  This reduces expected future inflation, and thus the real 
interest rate (both in local and foreign currency) rises, reducing the output gap.  In other words, 
the credibility of the inflation target may enhance the central bank’s ability to control the real 
interest rate. 
The bilateral real exchange rate component in the IS curve captures the balance sheet 
effect of an exchange rate movement. It is the change in the sol/US$ bilateral real exchange rate. 
If the domestic currency depreciates in real terms against the US dollar, the output gap goes 
down. 
It must be said that, as is the case in any partially dollarized economy, the extent and 
effects of dollarization on the economy are difficult to measure. In particular, large exchange rate 
movements may have nonlinear effects on economic activity. What is more, it might be the case 
that an unexpected large domestic currency depreciation causes a severe economic downturn if 
the negative balance sheet effect dominates the real exchange rate increase’s positive effect on 
economic activity. In this case, there would be a negative pass-through from domestic currency 
depreciation to inflation. Carranza et al. (2004) find that the higher the degree of financial 
dollarization of an economy, the higher the asymmetry of the pass-through from a nominal 
exchange rate increase to inflation, where an asymmetric pass-through is defined as a negative 
pass-through coefficient during economic downturns. The presence of this asymmetry is more 
  22likely for larger depreciations of the domestic currency. The QPM assumes moderate exchange 
rate changes; thus, these nonlinear effects are not activated in the forecasting horizon. 
It should also be noted that the traditional positive effect of a domestic currency real 
depreciation over net exports, and thus on the output gap, is captured by the multilateral real 
exchange rate, which is also present in the IS equation. 
Finally, the foreign currency interest rate component captures the presence of financial 
dollarization.
8 Given that there is financial dollarization, changes in the interest rate in foreign 
currency will affect consumption and investment decisions in the same way these were affected 
by the domestic currency interest rate. Thus, changes in the interest rate in foreign currency will 
affect the output gap. 
Exchange rate equation. The exchange rate equation relates spot exchange rate 
movements to the difference between the domestic currency interest rate and the foreign 
currency interest rate. There is also a risk premium term in the explanation of exchange rate 
dynamics. 
Because of financial dollarization, the central bank smoothes out the path of the exchange 
rate with forex interventions. To reflect this policy, there is an inertia term in the exchange rate 
equation. 
Monetary policy rule. It is well established that monetary policy actions affect inflation 
with a lag. This lag is estimated to be around one year in the Peruvian economy (Armas et al., 
2001), while in countries with more developed financial systems and a longer record of low 
inflation rates the lag is greater (two years or more). 
In the model, the central bank’s operational target (interbank overnight interest rate) 
depends on two variables: the deviation of the inflation forecast from the inflation target (2.5 
percent) and the output gap. When the inflation forecast is 2.5 percent and the output gap is 
closed, the operational target should be equal to the theoretical monetary policy neutral stance. 
There is also a smoothing term in the monetary policy rule. 
The exchange rate, by contrast, is not included in the rule: the operational target only 
responds to exchange rate movements for inflation considerations. This does not mean that 
                                            
8 The inclusion of the foreign currency interest rate in the IS curve acknowledges the fact that local and foreign 
currencies remain imperfect substitutes in the credit market. 
  23potential nonlinear effects of large domestic currency depreciations are not taken into 
consideration by the Central Bank. The next section of this paper assesses these considerations. 
 
3.2 Inflation Targeting in Practice, 2002-04 
 
During the first three years of inflation targeting experience in Peru, economic activity has been 
recovering, so that the output gap has been negative but smoothly closing. Short-run CPI-
inflation fluctuations have been driven mainly by supply shocks and imported inflation, while 
inflation expectations have been, in general, at the target level. 
Monetary policy actions have followed a criterion of anticipation to inflationary or 
deflationary pressures using inflation forecasting systems conditioned to monetary policy stance 
scenarios. These forecasts have been disclosed to the public through the Inflation Report to 
communicate monetary policy actions and to contribute to anchoring inflation expectations. 
This section describes Peruvian monetary policy under inflation targeting. It explains 
how inflation converged to the target, gradually rising from around zero percent in a context of 
economic recession in 2000 and 2001. It then comments on recent inflation trends. 
Starting Point: Deflation Risk 
When inflation targeting was adopted in 2002, the economy was in a recession (GDP growth was 
0.3 percent in 2001) and there was a deflation risk (the inflation rate was zero percent in 2001 
and negative during the first quarter of 2002). In this context, the monetary policy stance was 
expansive to circumvent deflationary pressures and achieve the inflation target. The loosening of 
the monetary policy stance was aggressive and began in the second half of 2001 (the interbank 
rate fell from 8.4 percent in July to 3.1 percent in December) and continued during the first half 
of 2002, when the interbank rate reached 2.5 percent (historically, the lowest rate in the money 
market
9) with a spread of 50 basis points over Libor. 
                                            
9 Between 1922 and 1930, the interest rate in the money market was 3.0 percent. 
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  25Given the lags on the effects of monetary policy, the year-on-year rate of inflation began 
to show an increasing pattern in the second half of 2002 (Figure 5). The reversal of deflationary 
pressures occurred in a context of economic recovery (the growth rate rose from 0.3 percent in 
2001 to 4.9 percent in 2002).  The rate of inflation rose from –0.1 percent in 2001 to 1.5 percent 
in 2002 (lower bound of the target range) to 2.5 percent in 2003 (target level).  
In the second half of 2002, the Central Bank tightened its monetary policy stance and the 
interbank interest rate rose from 2.6 percent in June to 3.8 percent in December. This tightening 
of the monetary policy stance occurred in a context of upward pressures on the exchange rate due 
to increased risk perceptions in the region from the electoral process in Brazil and the increasing 
trend in the rate of inflation. 
In 2003-04, the variability of the inflation rate was mainly explained by supply shocks. 
These shocks had a transitory impact on a specific set of goods but they did not affect the 
growing trend of prices. Therefore, the Central Bank did not respond to these shocks but 
emphasized their temporary nature in its Inflation Reports in order to guide economic agents’ 
inflation expectations. 
Indeed, the Central Bank published in the balance of risks in the January 2003 Inflation 
Report the possible impact on the inflation forecast of an increase in the international oil price 
due to the war in the Middle East: 
“The possibility of a war conflict in the Middle East. This would affect the 
international oil market, which would impact on oil prices. The magnitude of the 
impact would depend on the duration of the conflict. In the short run, raw oil 
prices would rise above projections, pushing the general price level upwards. 
However, this increase could be transitory and would not get transmitted to other 
prices, which would not require any change in the monetary policy stance.”
10 
 
The rise in international oil prices due to the war in Iraq (WTI price rose from US$29 in 
December 2002 to US$36 in February 2003) caused a sharp increase in the rate of inflation, 
which increased from 1.5 percent in December 2002 to 3.4 percent in March 2003. Inflation 
expectations for 2003 (from a survey of financial institutions) increased from 2.0 percent in 
December 2002 to 2.5 percent in March and 2.9 percent in April 2003 (Figure 6). 
                                            
10 Inflation Report of January 2003, p. 27. 
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Figure 6. Inflation Expectations of the Financial System  
for the Year-End 2003 
(Percent) 
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Once the impact of the increase in oil prices vanished, the Central Bank’s inflation 
projections fell under the scenario of a constant interbank interest rate at 3.8 percent and the 
expected rate of inflation was in the lower half of the target range for 2003. The Inflation Report 
of May 2003 stated: 
“With respect to the January Report’s projections, lower inflationary pressures are 
clearly observed. Thus, while in the January Report the projected rate of inflation 
was in the upper half of the target range (2.5-3.5 percent), in the present Report it 
lies in the lower one (1.5-2.5 percent). This update is due to lower depreciation 
expectations (from a 3.1 percent cumulative depreciation projection for 2003 in 
the January Report to 1.1 percent) and the reversion of transitory increases in 
international fuel prices for the rest of the year.”
11  
 
Thus, the May Report’s projections clearly communicated the temporary nature of the 
inflation increase, anticipated downward pressures on the rate of inflation and, therefore, helped 
to correct the interpretation of the subsequent loosening in the monetary policy stance. 
In the first half of 2003, the Central Bank maintained a stable monetary policy stance 
with an interbank interest rate of 3.8 percent. In the second half of the year, the Central Bank 
loosened its monetary policy stance four times through reductions in its benchmark interest rates, 
which induced reductions in the interbank interest rate of 25 basis points in July, September and 
                                            
11 Inflation Report of May 2003, pp. 23-24. 
  27November, and of 50 basis points in August. Until July 2004, the interbank interest rate was 2.5 
percent. 
This loosening of the monetary policy stance was explained for the projections of a rate 
of inflation in the lower bound of the target range for 2003 and 2004 and a lower than projected 
rate of growth in domestic demand for these years. In December 2003, the annual rate of 
inflation was 2.5 percent, that is, at the announced target level. 
 
Inflationary Pressures in 2004 
 
For 2004, the Central Bank forecasted an inflation rate around the upper bound (3.5 percent) and 
a reverse trend to the target level for 2005. In this period, the dynamics of inflation have been 
influenced by aggregate demand and supply factors, the evolution of imported inflation and the 
nominal exchange rate.  
The annual rate of inflation accelerated in the first half of 2004. After some months of 
increasing trend after November 2003, the annual inflation rate in August hit 4.6 percent, above 
the upper limit of the target range (3.5 percent). This higher inflation rate has been related mainly 
to supply shocks resulting from higher imported food inflation (wheat and oils) and lower 
domestic agricultural supply. These shocks were longer and stronger than in the previous year 
and the level forecast in the base line of the inflation report. 
Because of the transitory nature of these shocks, the Central Bank did not react to them, 
as it did in the first quarter of 2003. The Inflation Report of January 2004 stated:  
“The central scenario foresees the recent increase in prices as a transitory effect, 
both in the evolution of international food prices and in conditions of domestic 
agricultural supply. For example, it has been considered for this scenario that 
future prices of wheat and soy oil would stay at high levels in the first case, and 
would slightly diminish in the second half of the year in the case of soy oil. 
Likewise, it has considered a reduction in rice crops, and its impact on prices, due 
to lower sowing explained by lower availability of water. 
However, there is a risk of higher imported food inflation or higher 
instability in weather conditions (rain) with respect to the central scenario.”
12 
 
                                            
12 Inflation Report of January 2004, pp. 47-48. 
  28With these foresights, a transitory acceleration of the rate of inflation and then a 
convergence to the target level was expected, without a modification of the Central Bank’s 
monetary policy stance.  
The central scenario for 2004 was revised upward twice in the next two Inflation Reports 
(May and August). The inflation forecast for 2004 approached the upper bound of the inflation 
target range (3.5 percent). This higher inflation forecast was due to stronger supply shocks 
(especially higher international prices) relative to those expected in the January Report. In this 
context and to prevent a rise in inflation expectations, Central Bank raised the interbank rate 
twice in August and October from 2.5 to 3.0 percent. By the end of 2004, the inflation rate was 
3.5 percent (the upper bound); it decreased to 3.0 percent in January, following reversals of 
supply shocks (Figure 7). 
 
  Figure 7. Inflation Forecast

























































May 2004 Inflation Report 
August 2004 Inflation Report 
Upper bound: 3.5 % 
Target: 2.5 % 
Lower bound: 1.5 % 
 
 
4.  Financial Dollarization Risk Control 
 
The previous two sections of the paper showed that financial dollarization is considered for 
monetary policy design and implementation. However, even with financial dollarization, 
inflation targeting in Peru is not so different from that in countries without this phenomenon. 
 
  29For the inflation target to be credible, it should be perceived as the central bank’s most 
important target.  No other variable, such as the exchange rate, should overshadow it.  This is, 
however, not necessarily inconsistent with forex interventions.  Letting the exchange rate float 
freely in a financially dollarized economy involves considerable risks.  This section describes the 
additional policies, beyond IT, that mitigate the risks posed by financial dollarization (BCRP, 
2003).  These policies aim to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to large exchange rate 
movements by promoting financial dedollarization; attempt to induce economic agents to 
internalize financial dollarization risks; and attempt to prevent balance sheet effects, aiming at 
the same time at ensuring availability of liquid funds in foreign currency for a contingent 
financial sector liquidity shortage.  Figure 8 summarizes the monetary policy framework in Peru.  
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Figure 8. Monetary Policy Framework in Peru
- IT
Dedollarization policies - Short-term interest rate as operational target
- Yield curve in domestic currency
Inflation targeting + Financial dollarization risk control
- Availability of foreign currency liquid funds:
Internalization of risks and policy
responses to negative shocks    - High reserve requirements for foreign currency liabilities
Financial dollarization considerations:    - High NIR level
- Exchange rate path smoothing:
Phillips curve : low pass-through   - Forex interventions
IS: - foreign currency interest rate    - CDR
- balance sheet effect    - Escape clause for interbank interest rate
UIP: exchange rate inertia
 
  314.1  Dedollarization Policies 
 
To reduce financial dollarization risks, the first policy to implement should be to reduce financial 
dollarization. Financial dollarization in Peru is significant. However, it has been decreasing over 
the past few years, as shown in Table 5. To illustrate this reduction, banking system broad 
money dollarisation has decreased by 12 percentage points (from 67 percent to 55 percent) since 
the adoption of IT; in the same way, dollarization of credit to the private sector fell 6 percentage 




                  
Table 5. Financial Dollarization Indicators    
(Percentage of total monetary aggregate)      
                  
          
Year 
 
Banking system broad 
money 
Banking system credit to 
the private sector 
Financial system credit to 
the private sector 
                  
          
1993   69  76  77 
1994   64  74  74 
1995   63  71  72 
1996   67  74  72 
1997   65  77  75 
1998   69  80  79 
1999   70  82  82 
2000   70  82  81 
2001   67  80  78 
2002   65  79  76 
2003   62  77  73 
2004   55  74  71 
                  
 
 
The fact that credit dedollarization has been slower than deposit dedollarization might be 
related to the fall in domestic currency depreciation expectations. If borrowers expect that the 
domestic currency will appreciate against the U.S. dollar, they will prefer to borrow foreign 
currency,
14 especially considering that financial institutions’ interest rates for foreign currency 
loans are lower than those for domestic currency loans. However, the institutions might be 
                                            
13 The valuation effect due to domestic currency appreciation in 2003 and 2004 explains around 1 percentage point 
of the reduction in financial dollarization indicators in these two years. 
  32failing to internalize financial dollarization risks. The increase in mortgage loans in U.S. dollars 
during 2004 is an example. 
In 2002-04, there was a high level of dynamism in credit to the private sector in domestic 
currency. The financial system increased its credit to the private sector in soles (including 
holdings of corporate bonds by institutional investors) at annual growth rates of more than 10 
percent. Micro finance institutions (annual growth rates of 25 percent in 2003 and 32 percent in 
2002) and institutional investors (32 percent in 2003) stood out among the other financial 
institutions. 
                                                                                                                                             
14 The uncovered interest rate parity does not hold at every moment in time. 
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Table 6. The Financial Syetem’s Credit to the Private Sector in Domestic Currency
Percentage change







Commercial banks1/  7,642 7,841 8,221  8,464 2.6 4.9 3.0
Banco de la Nación  222 434 511  1,051 95.6 17.6 105.9
Micro finance institutions  2,214 2,926 3,666  4,329 32.2 25.3 18.1
Institutional investors2/  1,688 1,653 2,180  2,307 -2.1 31.9 5.8
Leasing companies and others 247 393 247  306 59.1 -37.2 23.9
Total financial system  12,014 13,248 14,824  16,457 10.3 11.9 11.0
1/ Excludes micro finance credits.
2/ Mainly securities issued by the private sector
Millions of new soles 
  
Financial system credit to the private sector in foreign currency fell in 2002 and 2003 (negative growth rates of 2 and 3 
percent, respectively). Although institutional investors increased their credit in foreign currency (23 and 36 percent in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively), commercial banks reduced it (negative growth rates of 3 and 6 percent in 2002 and 2003, respectively). 
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Table 7. The Financial System’s Credit to the Private Sector in Foreign Currency
Percentage change







Commercial banks1/  10,294 9,971 9,409 9,465  -3.1 -5.6 0.6
Banco de la Nación  36 36 22 22  -0.4 -38.1 -1.2
Micro finance institutions  428 410 511 665  -4.1 24.5 30.2
Institutional investors2/  653 800 1,091 1,333  22.7 36.2 22.2
Leasing companies and others  915 858 637 639  -6.2 -25.8 0.2
Total financial system  12,326 12,077 11,670 12,124  -2.0 -3.4 3.9
1/ Excludes micro finance credits.
2/ Mainly securities issued by the private sector
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This dedollarization process has been encouraged by some of the policies the Central 
Bank has implemented. inflation targeting is in itself one of these policies, given that it favors 
anchoring long-run inflation expectations, a necessary condition to build healthy local financial 









1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 
Inflation target  Inflation expectation two years in 
advance  Source: Consensus forecast.
Figure 9. Inflation Target and Expectations, 1995-2005 
 
 
From Figure 9 it seems that the difference between inflation expectations and the 
inflation target has tended to decrease. Inflation expectations in the medium run have been 
anchored: they are similar to the inflation target (2.5 percent). For example, in February 2004, 
expected inflation for December 2005 was 2.4 percent. This might have contributed to price 
setting in the economy. 
This fact may be related to the reputation the Central Bank has as an institution seriously 
committed to its inflation target. Comparing the performance of accomplishment of inflation 
targets, Albagli (2004) shows that the relative deviation of inflation from its target has been 
lower in Peru than the average deviation for inflation targeting countries, over the past ten years. 
When inflation has deviated from the target in Peru, this deviation has usually been negative 
  36(actual inflation was lower than the inflation target), especially during the disinflation process 
(Armas et al. 2001). 
Although the medium-run inflation expectation seems to be anchored around the inflation 
target, the long-run inflation expectation is more relevant for long-run savings and borrowing 
decisions. It is possible to get an idea about this by looking at the yields in the domestic currency 
bonds market. Table 8 shows that the spread between the yield of Treasury bonds in nominal 
domestic currency for a maturity of 7 years (the current longest term) and the yield of Treasury 
inflation indexed bonds in domestic currency for the same maturity, that is, expected inflation, is 
gradually approaching the inflation target. 
 
 
Table 8. Treasury Bond Interest Rates in the Local Capital Market 
Date  7-year T-bond Spread Inflation 
(in nominal domestic currency) (inflation indexed) (accumulated over the last year)
Aug. 2004  12.63  6.81 5.82 4.59 
Sep. 2004  11.31  6.10 5.21 4.03 
Oct. 2004  9.94  5.93 4.01 3.5 
Nov. 2004  9.72  5.90 3.82 4.08 
Dec. 2004  9.60  6.05 3.55 3.48 
Feb. 2005  8.26  5.81 2.45 1.68 
 
 
Part of the reduction in long-run inflation expectation could also be due to the reputation 
of commitment to low inflation the Central Bank has gained since it adopted inflation targeting: 
it has always achieved its target since 2002. Table 8 shows that market recognition of the Central 
Bank’s commitment to its inflation target (last column) helped to reduce long-run inflation 
expectations (third column in the table). This proxy for the long-run inflation expectation (7 
years ahead) was by February 2005 similar to the inflation target: 2.45 percent. 
A second explanation for the dedollarization process is the greater stability of real returns 
of assets denominated in domestic currency. Financial dollarisation is reduced when real returns 
on these assets become more stable than returns on assets in foreign currency (Ize and Levy-
Yeyati 1998). Inflation targeting has helped reduce inflation variability. However, it is also 
crucial that the variability of nominal interest rates in domestic currency is low. 
The operational target was gradually changed from banking reserves to the interbank 
overnight interest rate. This change reduced the variability of the latter, and has helped to 
  37increase the stability and predictability of the short-term interest rate in domestic currency. A 
stable and predictable short-term interest rate favors the development of long-term financial 
instruments, inducing financial dedollarization and thus reducing the vulnerability of the 
economy to the balance sheet effect of large exchange rate movements. 
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(nominal terms) In domestic currency
1998 2,265 60  -.-  -.-  -.-
1999 2,705 60  -.-  -.-  -.-
2000 4,005 88  -.- 2.0  -.-
2001 4,598 792 1,200 2.0 2.2
2002 5,088 756 1,933 2.0 2.1
2003 6,956 1,124 2,660 2.8 3.0
2004 8,629 1,226 3,751 2.9 4.4
Jan. 2005 7,789 1,329 3,928 2.9 4.5
Feb. 2005 7,846 1,396 4,138 2.9 4.6
1/ Includes only non-financial firms
2/ Includes financial and non-financial firms
Private sector bonds








The gradual development of the local government bonds market in domestic currency has made it possible to build a yield curve in 






                                            
15 Before 2001 there were no benchmark interest rates for the issuance of nominal securities in domestic currency. Since 2001, the Treasury began to issue 
nominal bonds in soles with maturities of two and three years. The government bonds market grew slowly, but it was not until 2003 when it showed its largest 
expansion, with the implementation of the primary dealers system. At the end of 2004, there were nominal Treasury bonds in domestic currency with maturities 
up to 7 years. Private sector firms have followed these Treasury bonds issues: corporate bonds have been issued at terms of four and five years. 

























Interbank 6 months 1 year 1.5 years 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years
Yield (%)
April 2003 December 2003 December 2004







  40As a result, securities denominated in domestic currency amounted to 33 percent of fixed-
income securities issued by the private sector in 2004 (22 percent in 2000). It is important to 
notice that the share of nominal soles bonds has rapidly increased over the last few years, as 




Year  Nominal VAC Total currency
1998  1 26 27 73 
1999  1 22 23 77 
2000  2 20 22 78 
2001  11 17 28 72 
2002  13 17 30 70 
2003  16 18 34 66 
2004  16 17 33 67 
Jan. 2005  18 18 36 64 
Feb. 2005  18 18 36 64 
Table 10. Composition OF Fixed Income Securities 
Issued by the Private Sector  1/
Domestic currency




Finally, the Parliament issued a law in mid-2004 ordering all prices to be listed in 
domestic currency. However, the option of listing prices also in foreign currency was left open. 
This law increases the transparency of price information. It might also encourage financial 
dedollarization in the long run, given that before the law was issued durable goods prices were 
being set in foreign currency. This might have been related to the fact that one of the reasons 
why people demand foreign currency is as a store of value, and buying a durable good or a house 
(which were also priced in foreign currency) are ways of storing value. 
 
4.2 Internalization of Financial Dollarization Risk and Policy Responses to Negative Shocks 
 
Financial dollarization causes two types of mismatches in the balance sheet of economic agents 
(Baliño et al. 1999): maturity and currency mismatches. Regarding the latter mismatch, it causes 
  41the private nonfinancial sector to face an exchange rate risk. This is because its income is 
basically denominated in domestic currency, while it has debts in foreign currency. Thus, an 
unexpected large domestic currency depreciation may trigger the alarm on the solvency of the 
private nonfinancial sector, thereby increasing the financial sector’s credit risk. 
The financial sector, on the other hand, has a maturity mismatch that is related to the fact 
that it has short-term liabilities in foreign currency, while its assets in the same currency have a 
longer average maturity. Although this type of liquidity risk is common to banking systems, the 
risk in a financially dollarized economy is higher because the central bank does not issue foreign 
currency. 
 
High Level of International Reserves 
If the economy suffers a negative shock, liquid funds in foreign currency will be necessary to 
reduce its effects, that is, to reduce an excessive exchange rate volatility that could trigger the 
balance sheet effect on the economy, a speculative attack on the domestic currency or even a 
bank run. If a bank run on foreign currency denominated deposits occurs, a high level of net 
international reserves would be a buffer stock for supporting the financial system. 
The availability of a high level of international reserves may in itself be an insurance 
against negative shocks:
16 if people perceive that the financial system has or is able to obtain 
liquid foreign currency funds (from the central bank’s international reserves) in a bank run 
situation in order to back its liquid foreign currency liabilities, the probability of the bank run 
itself occurring in the first place will be very low. 
According to Gulde et al. (2004), in the case of a bank run, foreign currency liabilities 
need to be paid at par against foreign currency, which inhibits any equilibrating adjustment 
through the exchange rate. Thus, central banks need international reserves to provide foreign 
currency lender of last resort support to distressed banks if these do not have enough liquid 
foreign currency assets to back their liquid foreign currency liabilities. This idea could be 
rounded out by saying that international reserves are also important to prevent a bank run in the 
sense that they insure against the effects of negative shocks. 
                                            
16 The estimation of an optimal international reserves level as “self insurance” for a financially dollarized economy 
goes beyond the scope of this paper. Clearly, this optimal level should depend on the degree of financial dollariation, 
fiscal and banking solvency, and degree of openness of the economy, among other variables. 
  42International reserves are also necessary for the central bank to carry out eventual forex 
interventions aimed at smoothing the path of the exchange rate, particularly in an unexpected 
large domestic currency depreciation episode. 
Gulde et al. (2004) point out that international reserves covered nearly all foreign 
currency deposits in the Peruvian banking system during 2002. Together with sound 
fundamentals, this explains the stability of foreign exchange deposits in Peru during the last 
Argentine crisis, when Paraguay, Uruguay, and (to some extent) Bolivia, all of which are 
financially dollarized South American economies like Peru, suffered a contagion effect that 
triggered runs on foreign currency liabilities. 
Since the beginning of 2003, the Central Bank has purchased around US$4.5 billion (as 
of March 31, 2005) in the foreign exchange market. This has allowed the strengthening of the 
Central Bank’s international reserves position and its accommodation of portfolio movements in 
a context of steady financial dedollarization (BCR 2004). The Central Bank has accumulated 
US$4.0 billion in net international reserves, with respect to December 2002. Thus, the stock of 
international reserves reached a balance of more than US$13.5 billion in March 2005, the highest 
ever recorded. It is an important buffer stock against any disruption in the economy, considering 
that it is more than twice the stock of the due-in-one-year external debt. The coverage ratios of 
short-term external liabilities and broad money show that international liquidity indicators have 
improved in the last two years. 
 
  Table 11. International Liquidity Indicators
NIR / Short-term external liabilities  1.5 times 1.7 times 2.2 times 2.2 times  2.3 times
NIR / imports of goods and services  13 months 14 months 16 months 15 months  15 months
NIR / banking system broad money  61 percent 61 percent 65 percent 67 percent  69 percent




High Reserve Requirement on Dollar Liabilities 
  
A criticism of keeping a high level of international reserves is the moral hazard that is present in 
every insurance system. Given that economic agents know that there is a high probability that the 
central bank would use the international reserves to provide liquidity in a “bad state of nature,” 
the financial system may fail to internalize dollarization risks. To prevent this, the financial 
  43system has a high reserve requirement on foreign currency liabilities, which reduces this perverse 
incentive. 
There is a 6 percent reserve requirement on commercial banks’ domestic currency 
liabilities. For foreign currency liabilities, the reserve requirement is higher: 30 percent. In this 
way, there is an incentive for economic agents to internalize the potential costs (exchange rate 
and liquidity risks) of financial dollarization. 
High reserve requirements on foreign currency banks’ liabilities also have a second 
purpose: these funds can be used by the central bank if there is a liquidity shortage, allowing the 
Central Bank to act as a lender of last resort in a currency it does not issue but that is widely used 
as store of value. Actually, they are part of international reserves. 
 
Exchange Rate Smoothing in a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime 
 
Last, but not least, the Central Bank has a policy of moderating excessive exchange rate 
volatility in order to minimize the negative effects of large exchange rate movements in a 
financially dollarized economy. Since the adoption of inflation targeting in 2002, the standard 
deviation of the exchange rate has on average been similar to the average of the previous three-
year period (Table 12). 








The average standard deviation is an average for monthly standard
deviations in each of the two periods considered in the table.
 
  44However, forex interventions are not committed to a fixed or stable exchange rate 
because that would be inconsistent with the inflation targeting framework. Moreover, it would 
probably lead to a moral hazard problem: economic agents may fail to internalize the inherent 
currency risk of financial dollarisation if they perceive that the central bank is providing them 
with implicit foreign exchange insurance through forex interventions targeting an exchange rate 
level. 
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) present a portfolio model of financial intermediation in 
which currency choice is determined by hedging decisions on both sides of a bank’s balance 
sheet. The authors show that dollarization hysteresis occurs when the expected volatility of the 
inflation rate is high in relation to that of the real exchange rate. 
Thus, although excessive exchange rate movements are risky in a financially dollarized 
economy (because of the balance sheet effect), it is convenient to let the exchange rate float 
because that is an incentive for economic agents to dedollarize. In turn, lower dollarization 
reduces the risks of high exchange rate variability. The reduction in financial dollarization in 
Peru might allow the Central Bank to let the exchange rate float more. 
The standard deviation of the interbank overnight interest rate, by contrast, shows a sharp 
reduction. This is consistent with the Central Bank’s desire to enhance the role of the interbank 
overnight interest rate as an indicator of the  monetary policy stance. 
Table 13. Interest Rate Variability






The average standard deviation is an average for monthly standard deviations
in each of the two periods considered in the table.
 
  45The Central Bank can also issue exchange rate–indexed securities (CDRs) to smooth the 
path of the exchange rate, in particular when there are domestic currency depreciation pressures. 
These CDRs are denominated in domestic currency but adjusted for foreign currency price 
movements. Thus, they are aimed at providing the market with a hedging asset; in this way, they 
reduce the upward pressure on the exchange rate. This market instrument is also used in Brazil 
and Chile. 
The design of the operational target of monetary policy, explained in section 2, also 
works as a mechanism to smooth the exchange rate path in extreme situations. As in the case of 
CDRs, the purpose is to reduce domestic currency depreciation pressures. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Peru is the only financially dollarized economy that has adopted an inflation targeting framework 
for monetary policy. Thus, the country’s inflation targeting design and implementation differs in 
some respects from other nondollarized inflation targeting countries. This paper describes those 
differences. 
With respect to the design of monetary policy, the inflation target in Peru is the lowest in 
Latin America (2.5 percent, +/- 1 percentage point). With strict price stability, similar to U.S. 
long-run inflation, the domestic currency is in a better position to compete against the U.S. 
dollar. Thus, there is a higher probability of being able to maintain current low real and payments 
dollarization in the economy. 
The operational target has changed from a monetary one to the interbank overnight 
interest rate, favoring financial dedollarization. In extreme situations, the operational target for 
the interest rate may transitorily increase to prevent a large domestic currency depreciation that 
could be harmful for the financial system. 
The implementation of monetary policy is different from other non-dollarized ITs in 
terms of the principal model used for inflation forecasting and the policies that the Central Bank 
implements to deal with financial dollarisation risks. These policies can be divided into three 
types: dedollarization, internalization of financial dollarization risks by economic agents, and 
measures to prevent a contingent crisis scenario. The last sort of policies aim at smoothing the 
exchange rate path and the availability of foreign currency liquid funds. 
  46Although excessive exchange rate movements are risky in a financially dollarized 
economy (balance sheet effect), it is convenient to let the exchange rate float because that is an 
incentive for economic agents to dedollarize. In turn, lower dollarization reduces the risks of 
higher exchange rate variability. 
The first three years (2002-04) of inflation targeting implementation in a financially 
dollarized economy like Peru provide encouraging results and lessons. In the first place, the 
empirical evidence shows that financial dollarization does not preclude an independent monetary 
policy oriented at maintaining a low and stable inflation rate. Peru’s announced annual inflation 
target has been achieved every year since inflation targeting was adopted: 1.5 percent in 2002, 
2.5 percent in 2003, and 3.5 percent in 2004 (basically related to supply shocks). Output 
variability was moderate in these years. 
Second, changing the operational target from a monetary aggregate to the interbank 
overnight interest rate has improved the transparency and predictability of the monetary policy 
stance. It has also favored the issuance of long-term financial instruments by the private sector, 
thus inducing financial dedollarization. 
Third, a gradual dedollarization process has been observed in the Peruvian economy 
during the last years in the financial system’s assets and liabilities. This process has been 
encouraged by the explicit inflation targeting framework, with more predictable inflation and 
domestic currency interest rates, and by the development of the local government debt market in 
domestic currency, which is useful for setting a benchmark for issuance of private sector nominal 
domestic currency securities. 
Fourth, the Peruvian monetary policy framework (inflation targeting plus financial 
dollarization risk control) has managed to keep the economy away from suffering the contagion 
effect of the Argentine crisis, which affected other South American financially dollarized 
economies (2001-02).  
Finally, the short Peruvian inflation targeting experience still cannot provide a definite 
answer on how to completely restore long-run confidence in the local currency: the degree of 
financial dollarization is still high and its risks remain. However, inflation targeting seems to be 
the appropriate approach to the complex phenomenon of a dual currency economy like Peru.  
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